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One of the fundamental assumptions in the literature on economic globalization is that economic 
openness generates greater economic volatility and insecurity.  Casting doubt on this assumption, this 
study explores how openness affects workers’ perceptions of economic insecurity. Analyzing the 
combined aggregate and individual-level survey data, I find a significant divergence in the impact of 
openness between developed and developing countries; both the level and growth of trade are linked to 
greater perceived job insecurity in the non-OECD countries but to less perceived job insecurity in the 
OECD countries. Calling into question the openness-insecurity link, this study emphasizes that 
understanding the complexity of the linkages between globalization and economic insecurity is crucial 
for assessing various causal arguments of the existing studies of globalization as well as for better 
understanding the problems and constraints brought up by global economic forces.   
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One of the fundamental assumptions in the growing literature on economic globalization 
is that worldwide economic integration generates greater economic volatility and insecurity. 
Based on this assumption, recent scholars of international political economy (IPE) have 
advanced the so-called compensation hypothesis, claiming that globalization would reinforce 
rather than dismantle the welfare state. According to this argument, increasing global 
economic integration brings about greater societal demand for the role of the state in 
compensating the losers of globalization (Burgoon 2001; Garrett 1998, 2001; Garrett & 
Mitchell 2001; Rodrik 1997, 1998a). Henceforth, rather than being rendered irrelevant in a 
borderless world (Friedman 2000; Ohmae 1990), the state is as relevant as in the past or even 
more so as a provider of social protection and insurance in a globalizing world (Mann 1997; 
Weiss 2000). 
The economic volatility/insecurity assumption is widely shared among scholars, 
policymakers, and the public. In a recent survey of European nations, an overwhelming 
majority of respondents attributed to globalization such economic illnesses as job insecurity 
and high unemployment (Wilson et al. 2002). Other public opinion surveys reveal the 
continuing popularity of welfare programs, which is primarily driven by citizens’ perception 
that economic security has worsened in tandem with increasing economic integration (Boeri 
et al. 2001; Shapiro & Young 1989). Furthermore, as attested by political protests at virtually 
every major meeting of international financial institutions, economic anxiety and distress 
                                                          

 Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, April 2003, and at the Interdisciplinary Colloquium, Center for International 
and Comparative Studies, Northwestern University, May 2004. I thank the late Michael Wallerstein, 
Erik Wibbels, and Hyeok Yong Kwon for their valuable comments on various versions of the paper. I 
also appreciate the insightful comments from the two anonymous reviewers. 
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spawned by the deleterious effects of global market integration is the principal concern 
behind the recent backlash against globalization.  
Though scholars and commentators on globalization have taken it for granted that 
economic globalization leads to greater economic insecurity, it has not been studied much 
whether and how globalization is linked to the perceptions of economic insecurity among the 
public. This study explores the globalization-insecurity linkage by analyzing a survey 
question about the importance of job security from the Third-Wave World Values Surveys 
(1995-97). This study improves upon the existing research on the openness-insecurity 
relationship in a few aspects. First, while the previous studies relied mostly on individual-
level survey data when examining the openness-insecurity linkage (Aldrich et al. 1999; 
Anderson & Pontusson 2001), this study relates actual levels of openness to perceived job 
insecurity by merging aggregate economic data with opinion survey data. Second, compared 
to the existing research focusing on a handful of advanced industrial countries, this study 
examines and contrasts both developed and developing nations including transitional 
economies. This inclusion of developing countries is not simply to add more cases but to 
explore the differential impact of globalization on economic insecurity in countries of 
disparate levels of political and socioeconomic development. 
Indeed, one of the key findings of this study is the divergent pattern of the openness-
insecurity relationship between the developed and developing world. Increasing exposure to 
trade is linked to perceptions of greater job security among workers of non-OECD countries, 
whereas it is linked to lower levels of perceived job insecurity among those of OECD 
countries. Another major finding also reveals a differential effect of macroeconomic 
volatility on perceived job insecurity between developed and developing countries; 
macroeconomic volatility proxied by output volatility is associated to perceptions of greater 
job insecurity in the non-OECD sample of countries but not in the OECD sample.  
These findings, holding in various sensitivity and robustness tests, pose a puzzle for the 
aforementioned compensation argument and more generally for the literature on 
globalization. A central empirical pillar of the compensation argument is the positive 
association that IPE scholars have found between trade openness and government social 
spending in most of the postwar decades. The current results suggest, however, that 
increasing trade does not lead to greater demand for social spending via increased worker 
insecurity in the advanced world, as openness is not linked to higher perceived job insecurity 
in this region. The causal mechanism linking openness and social spending is thus under-
specified despite the voluminous research on the globalization-welfare state nexus.  
Also puzzling is the widespread discontent with globalization among the global public. If 
perceived economic insecurity is not necessarily higher in more open economies of the 
advanced world, what could then explain such a prevalent sense of economic insecurity and 
uncertainty among the citizens of these countries? One possibility can be found in the 
research by Torben Iversen and Thomas Cusack (2000), who attributed the increasing levels 
of insecurity to domestic industrial and labor-market changes rather than to economic 
globalization.
1
 Further research is clearly required, however, since perceptions of job 
insecurity in developing countries are still linked to economic openness and thus cannot be 
attributed to domestic causes only.  
                                                          
1 Iversen and Cusack (2000) argue that an industrial transformation from a manufacturing-based to a 
service-based economy, namely ‘deindustrialization,’ is primarily responsible for increasing economic 
insecurity and consequently for the expansion of the welfare state. 




This study is organized as follows. The next section contains a theoretical discussion of 
the presumed link between globalization and economic volatility/insecurity, followed by the 
empirical analysis section presenting the data, methods of estimation, and the findings. The 
final section concludes by discussing the implications of the study.  
 
 
2. GLOBALIZATION, ECONOMIC VOLATILITY, AND INSECURITY 
 
The apparently simple claim that globalization increases economic volatility and 
insecurity is in fact fraught with theoretical and analytical problems that have escaped close 
scrutiny in existing research. First, while economic insecurity and volatility are emblematic 
expressions of economic instability, they are phenomena of different attributes. Economic 
volatility concerns the variability of a certain economic condition or state, which can be 
measured by an objective economic indicator, whereas economic insecurity is a notion that is 
partly objective and partly subjective. A high rate of aggregate unemployment is a sign of 
objective economic insecurity, whereas individuals’ anxiety about a potential job loss is an 
expression of a subjective feeling of insecurity. Despite these differences, existing 
scholarship has not distinguished clearly between aggregate volatility and economic 
insecurity, presuming that globalization would have similar or even identical effects on both 
aspects of economic instability. 
Second, as to economic volatility, it is an unresolved issue whether increasing economic 
openness leads to greater aggregate volatility. Economic integration has dual effects on 
volatility. Trade-induced specialization according to comparative advantage may generate 
greater volatility as it concentrates risk in certain sectors or industries, whereas market 
expansion due to foreign trade can reduce domestic output volatility.
2
 Reflecting these 
theoretical ambiguities, the empirical evidence for the openness-volatility link is largely 
mixed. Some find a significantly positive effect of trade and financial openness on output 
volatility (Easterly et al. 2001; Gavin & Hausmann 1996), and others report an insignificant 
or even a negative impact of openness (IMF 2002).  
In contrast, studies of individual-level economic insecurity have generally found a 
negative effect of globalization on economic insecurity. Scheve and Slaughter (2002) 
maintain that globalization of production leads to greater worker insecurity since firms 
facing intense global competition would increasingly substitute away from labor towards 
other factors. Accordingly, labor demand becomes more elastic, leading to larger variances 
of wages and of employment. Their longitudinal analysis of the British Household Panel 
Survey (1991-1999) lends strong support to their conjecture, showing that workers employed 
in industries with greater foreign direct investment activities are more concerned about 
economic security. An extensive report recently published by the ILO (2004) also finds a 
negative impact of trade openness on economic security. Drawing on a number of national 
surveys of labor market conditions, the report ranks ninety ILO member countries on the 
Economic Security Index, which is constructed from several labor-related security indicators. 
An interesting finding of this report is that economic security declines sharply with trade 
openness at low levels of openness but increases with it at very high levels of openness.  
                                                          
2 Likewise, while a more integrated global financial market would be more susceptible to the contagion 
of country-specific shocks across borders, it will allow greater opportunities for consumption-
smoothing and investment diversification (Kim, 2007). 
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One possibility in the openness-insecurity linkage that has not been explored in the 
aforementioned research is that globalization may change perceptions of insecurity directly, 
unmediated by its effect on aggregate volatility or individual-level insecurity.
3
 It is highly 
probable that global economic integration has worsened perceived economic insecurity 
without necessarily causing any significant disruption in macroeconomic stability. If then, 
the discrepancy between the aforementioned findings for the openness-volatility relationship, 
on one hand, and those for the openness-insecurity relationship, on the other hand, may be 
understood as the differential effects of globalization on objective and subjective dimensions 
of economic insecurity.
4
   
This study examines this understudied aspect of the openness-insecurity link by 
analyzing the effects of globalization on perceived economic insecurity. It improves on the 
existing research in a few important ways. First, while existing survey analyses study the 
openness-insecurity relationship using only individual-level survey data (Boeri et al. 2001; 
Wilson et al. 2002), this study relates perceptions of economic insecurity to the actual degree 
of economic openness measured with aggregate economic data. Second, in contrast to the 
existing studies studying mostly advanced industrial countries, this study relies on a 
comprehensive cross-national survey dataset which allows a global assessment of public 
perceptions of economic insecurity. Third, controlling for the effect of aggregate volatility, 
this analysis isolates the direct effect of globalization on perceived economic insecurity from 
its indirect effect working through aggregate volatility. Finally, the study explicitly accounts 
for the sample selection problem that may well result in public opinion surveys on labor 
market issues such as the current one, as will be explained later.  
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
This section introduces the data and the methods for the analysis of the openness-




Economic insecurity pertaining to the risk of economic misfortune can be manifest in 
various forms (Anderson & Pontusson 2001; Dominitz & Manski 1996; Manski & Straub 
2000). This study focuses on job insecurity among those various aspects of economic 
insecurity for two reasons. First, job insecurity is a major type of economic insecurity as 
most people in a modern economy rely on wages for their lives. It is also a fundamental kind 
of insecurity, since other forms of insecurity such as income insecurity or workplace 
insecurity ultimately depends on the availability of employment. Second, job insecurity is 
one of the most commonly asked questions about economic conditions in national economic 
surveys, thus allowing a cross-national comparison. 
                                                          
3 One of the long-standing debates in political economy concerns the very possibility of a mismatch 
between objective economic conditions and subjective evaluations thereof (Fiorina 1978; Lewis-Beck 
1986).  
4 As reviewed here, the empirical evidence for the openness-volatility link is largely inconclusive, 
while studies using labor market and household surveys in general find the negative relationship 
between openness and insecurity. 




The current empirical investigation draws on the Third Wave of the World Values 
Surveys (1995-1997), which is composed of fifty-three national surveys.
5
 The following 
survey question was used to measure perceptions of job insecurity: “Here are some more 
aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones 
you personally think are important in a job? Good job security (among the listed aspects).”
6
 
Responses to this question were coded as one if good job security was mentioned and zero, 
otherwise. We can reasonably assume those who mention job security as an important 
concern to have more concern about job insecurity.
7
  
Note that the current job security question can impart different meanings depending on 
the respondent’s employment situation. Though employed workers are more secure than 
unemployed workers in their objective labor market conditions, the prospect of potential job 
loss may loom larger for the former than for the latter that have already underwent the event. 
The same can be said of the partly vs. fully employed workers. The opportunity cost of 
losing a job may be so high for fully employed workers that they may be more concerned 
about job security compared to part-time workers. All these considerations point to the need 
to distinguish the impact of openness on perceived job insecurity for workers of different 
employment conditions.  
The major independent variable in this analysis is the degree of economic openness, 
which is measured by two aggregate indicators capturing trade and financial integration. 
Trade openness is measured by the ratio of exports and imports to GDP, and financial 
openness by the ratio of gross private capital flows to GDP. Also included are the growth 
rates of the openness variables given the inherently dynamic nature of economic 
globalization.  
As mentioned earlier, we need to net out the indirect effect of openness through 
aggregate volatility in order to capture the direct impact of openness on economic insecurity. 
To this end, aggregate output volatility measured by the standard deviation of annual GDP 
growth rates is included as a control. Additional macro-level variables are included as they 
are likely to influence the level of perceived job insecurity; economy-wide unemployment 
rates, government social spending (as a share of GDP),
8
 and level of development (GDP per 
capita).
9
 For OECD countries, a more specific spending measure is available  the 
                                                          
5 The final sample was reduced to forty-three countries since some country surveys were not nationally 
representative or did contain the job security question used for the dependent variable.  
6 These listed aspects are: good pay, not too much pressure, a job respected by people in general, good 
hours, an opportunity to use initiative, generous holidays, a job in which you feel you can achieve 
something, a responsible job, a job that is interesting, and a job that meets one’s abilities. Each aspect 
is asked separately and one was allowed to choose more than one aspect. 
7 A question related to economic insecurity such as the current job security question has a normative 
implication and thus may well yield a skewed distribution of responses towards one. A glimpse of the 
response rates, however, reveals a substantial variation across countries. For instance, the percentage 
of the response mentioning job security as important ranges around 40% to 50% in countries like 
Columbia and Sweden, whereas it ranges about 60% to 70% for Australia, China, and Finland.  
8 All aggregate measures are the averages for 1990-94 except social spending which is entered as a 
lagged term given its endogenous nature. I appreciate an anonymous reviewer’s advice in this regard. 
9  Higher rates of unemployment would breed a widespread feeling of economic uncertainty. And 
greater welfare effort of the state would lead to less perceived job insecurity, as state-provided welfare 
programs can function as a buffer against economic risk. 
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combined expenditures on active labor market programs and unemployment compensation 
(as a share of total social spending). For non-OECD countries, I also control for a regime 
type, as democracies are expected to show lower levels of perceived job insecurity.  
Perceptions of job insecurity depend not only on aggregate conditions but also on various 
individual characteristics such as age, sex, education, class, and political ideology. Age can 
be positively or negatively related to perceptions of job insecurity. This is because while 
seniority practices lead to greater job tenure for old-aged workers, the opportunity cost of a 
job loss increases with age implying a positive relationship. Women may feel more insecure 
about their job tenure, especially in countries with unequal labor practices for female 
workers. Education is particularly important for job insecurity, since it closely correlates 
with an individual’s skill level, which is a chief determinant of one’s economic vulnerability. 
Class, approximated by the self-reported class status, also matters, as it summarizes an 
individual’s relative economic position.
10
 Finally, the respondent’s political leaning may be a 





The current empirical estimation of the openness-insecurity relationship draws on the 
following probit model, as the dependent variable is dichotomous:  
 
Prob(yi = 1) = Φ(β'xi,k + 'xi,h), 
 
where Prob(yi = 1) denotes the probability of mentioning good job security as important, xi,k 
is the vector of observations for k individual-level variables, xi,h is the vector of observations 
for h aggregate-level variables, β and  are the column vectors corresponding to individual 
and aggregate regressors, and Φ represents the cumulative distributive function for the 
standard normal distribution.  
There is a large amount of missing data in the current dataset, which can pose a problem 
for unbiased and efficient estimation. Missing data in the current dataset arise from two 
sources, reflecting the two levels of observations. At the individual level, data may be 
missing because of individual non-responses to a given survey question. At the aggregate 
level, missing data are due to the unavailability of some macro-level data for certain 
countries. As well-known in the literature of missing data, listwise deletion, a common 
practice in political science research, can lead to bias and inefficiency (Allen 2001; King et 
al. 2001). In the current dataset, aggregate-level data seem to be missing at random, whereas 
individual-level data appear to be non-random.
11
 At the individual level, those who feel more 
(or less) insecure may self-select themselves into a group of non-respondents to the job 
security question. This self-selection behavior arises because the conditions that affect how 
people feel about job security can also affect whether they express their concern about it.
12
  
                                                          
10 The class variable can also be taken as a proxy for one’s income level since the WVS dataset lacks 
an income variable that is compatible across countries. 
11 This is because there is a similar amount of missing data across the macro-level variables, whereas 
the job security question used for the dependent variable has a disproportionately large number of 
missing responses compared to other individual-level variables.  
12 Note, however, that it is not obvious whether those who are more concerned about job insecurity are 




In order to deal with the missing data, I used two methods, each applied to the aggregate 
and the individual-level data, respectively. For the macro-level variables whose missing data 
appear to be random, I rely on multiple imputations using Amelia (King et al. 2001). On the 
other hand, for the sample selection problem expected for individual-level observations, I use 
Heckman’s two-step procedure modified for the probit model (Heckman 1979).
13
 
The data analysis proceeds as follows. The first regressions reported in Table 1 uses the 
baseline specification for employed individuals, which includes the four openness indicators, 
three macro-level controls and other individual-level control variables. These baseline results 
are contrasted between two samples of countries, OECD and non-OECD. Additional 
regressions are then run to check the robustness of the baseline findings against different 
model specifications. In the regressions of Table 2, the baseline model is applied to 
individuals of different employment status to see how the impact of openness on perceived 
job insecurity varies with employment condition. One set of regressions includes all 
individuals, and the other includes only fully employed persons. Table 3 presents the 
sensitivity tests using alternative indicators of openness and additional controls. The last 
regressions of Table 4 check the sample selection problem. Finally, Figures 1 and 2 illustrate 
the marginal effects of the aggregate variables on the probability of mentioning job security 
as important. 
 
3.3. Baseline Results 
 
The baseline regressions shown in Table 1 reveal a markedly different impact of 
openness between advanced and developing countries. The level and growth of trade have a 
significantly positive effect on perceived job insecurity for the non-OECD sample, whereas 
both of them are negatively linked to perceived job insecurity in the OECD countries. While 
the effect of financial openness is somewhat different from those of trade openness, the 
growth rate of capital flows shows a significantly negative effect in the OECD sample but 
not in the non-OECD sample. All this suggests that perceived job insecurity increases with 




                                                                                                                                                      
more likely to answer the current job security question. Consider the employment status of a 
respondent, which may well affect both the level of her perceived job insecurity and her probability of 
answering the job security question. On one hand, a fully employed person may be more likely to 
answer the job security question because she is easier to contact. On the other hand, a part-time 
employee may be more likely to do so because she would be more eager to express her concern about 
job security, in which case sample selection will occur in the opposite direction.  
13 Heckman’s two-step method is based on the notion that sample selection is an omitted-bias problem. 
In this method, the first-stage regression derives the probability for a given sample unit to be observed 
based on some parameters that are thought to affect such a probability, and the second-stage 
regression estimates the relationship of main interest with this selection probability added as another 
regressor. Since standard Heckman models have non-binary dependent variables in the second-stage 
regression, I rely on a statistical command HECKPROB (in Stata) that fits probit models with sample 
selection, as the dependent variable of my second-stage regression is binary. I appreciate an 
anonymous reviewer’s comments on this point. 
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Table 1. Baseline Findings [Employed Persons] 
 
DV: Perceived Job Insecurity OECD Non-OECD 
Openness   
ln Trade  -4.778(.719)*** .043(.002)** 
ln Trade Growth -.281(.039)*** .008(.001)*** 
ln Private Capital Flows 3.687(.597)*** -.027(.013)** 
ln Private Capital Flow Growth -.078(.012)*** .0001(.0003) 
Aggregate Controls   
Output Volatility -.778(.122)*** .003(.002)* 
ln Unemployment 1.833(.311)*** .080(.012)*** 
ln Social Spending (1990) .025(.114) .051(.012)*** 
ln GDP per capita 3.070(.530)*** -.219(.013)*** 
Individual Controls   
Age -.001(.001) .011(.000)*** 
Sex (female=0, male=1) .045(.033) -.031(.017)* 
Education -.111(.009)*** -.033(.004)*** 
Class (1=upper to 5=lower) .015(.011) .017(.007)** 
Ideology (1=left to 10=right) -.008(.009) -.004(.003) 
Constant -10.854(.807)*** 1.741(.021)*** 
Pseudo R2 .0461 .0333 
N 6544 25303 
*** p <.01; ** p <.05; * p <.10.  Reported are the unstandardized probit coefficients and their standard 




Some of the aggregate control variables also exhibit differential effects on perceived job 
insecurity between the two samples of countries. Output volatility is linked to greater 
perceived job insecurity in the non-OECD sample but to perceptions of less job insecurity in 
the OECD sample. Also, in the non-OECD countries the level of development is negatively 
related to perceived job insecurity as expected, but positively related to it in the OECD 
countries. These findings suggest distinct dynamics underlying the openness-insecurity link 
between the developed and developing regions. Quite puzzling is the result for social 
spending, as it turns out to heighten rather than lessen perceived job insecurity. In particular, 
the coefficient on social spending is almost always positive for the non-OECD sample 
throughout the regressions of the current analysis.
14
 This seems to suggest the abuses and 




Turning to the individual-level controls, most control variables are significantly related 
                                                          
14 The coefficient on social spending is consistently positive only in the Non-OECD countries. For the 
OECD countries, it is positive but insignificant, and furthermore, when a more specific social 
spending measure (i.e., labor spending) is used, it becomes significantly negative (Table 3). 
15 For instance, in many Latin American countries, police salaries are recorded as social expenditures, 
and it is not unusual for a ruling government to appropriate even an earmarked share of social 
spending for different purposes. 




with perceived job insecurity in the expected direction in the non-OECD sample. Perceived 
job insecurity is worse among older, less-educated, lower-class, or female workers. On the 




3.4. Robustness Checks 
 
The regressions of Table 2 explore how the effect of openness varies by the condition of 
employment given the aforementioned possibility of different interpretations for the current 
job security question. The upper panel shows the regressions for all individuals and the lower 
panel for fully employed workers. Virtually all the baseline findings are preserved in this 
Table, especially those showing the contrasting effect of trade openness between the OECD 
and non-OECD countries. 
 
Table 2. Comparing Baseline Results by Employment Status 
 
DV: Perceived Job Insecurity OECD Non-OECD 
Openness [All Persons] 
ln Trade  -4.651(.630)*** .038(.017)** 
ln Trade Growth -.265(.035)*** .008(.001)*** 
ln Private Capital Flows 3.665(.521)*** -.007(.011) 
ln Private Capital Flow Growth -.076(.011)*** .0003(.0002) 
Aggregate Controls   
Output Volatility -.775(.107)*** .006(.002)*** 
ln Unemployment  1.812(.270)*** .100(.011)*** 
ln Social Spending (1990) .139(.099) .042(.010)*** 
ln GDP per capita 3.023(.450)*** -.204(.016)*** 
Openness [Fully Employed Persons] 
ln Trade  -4.679(.963)*** .071(.030)** 
ln Trade Growth -.286(.053)*** .007(.001)*** 
ln Private Capital Flows 3.642(.793)*** -.003(.018) 
ln Private Capital Flow Growth -.077(.016)*** -.0001(.0004) 
Aggregate Controls   
Output Volatility -.759(.163)*** .016(.004)*** 
ln Unemployment 1.809(.410)*** .105(.017)*** 
ln Social Spending (1990) .155(.156) .021(.018) 
ln GDP per capita 3.152(.693)*** -.111(.029)*** 
See the notes for Table 1. The individual-level controls are omitted for simplicity of presentation. 
 
 
Table 3 displays the regressions checking the stability of the baseline estimates against 
the use of alternative indicators or additional controls. In the OECD regressions, the measure 
of total social spending is replaced with a more specific measure of state-provided labor 
protection, and the Quinn Index for capital market openness (Quinn & Inclan 1997) is used 
                                                          
16 The largely insignificant effects of some demographic variables such as age and sex for the OECD 
countries seem to indicate active labor market policies of these countries that promote equal rights and 
protection in the workplace. 
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as an alternative measure of financial openness. For the non-OECD regressions, two 
measures of political democracy are added – Polity Score from the Polity IV database and 
the regime type from the ACLP dataset (Przeworski et al. 2000). 
 
Table 3. Sensitivity Checks 
See the notes for Table1. The individual-level controls are omitted for simplicity of presentation.  
 
 
As seen in the size and sign of the coefficients on the openness variables, the key result 
 the differential effects of trade openness between the developing and developed countries 
 remain unchanged despite the use of these alternative indicators or additional controls. 
Furthermore, the negative coefficient estimate on the Quinn Index implies that workers’ 




The final table shows the robustness tests using Heckman’s sample selection model. The 
results for the aggregate variables from the regressions with the sample selection model are 
very much similar to the baseline results, affirming the divergent effect of trade openness 
between the OECD and non-OECD sample. As to the selection effect of the employment 
status, the current result attests to the aforementioned dual implications of the full 
employment status.
18
 Note that the ρ parameter capturing the error correlation between the 
main and selection regression is insignificant in the OECD sample but significantly positive 
in the non-OECD sample, which indicates that in the developing countries those who are not 
                                                          
17  The results for some of the additional macro-level controls are notable. Surprisingly, the two 
measures of democracy are associated with greater perceptions of job insecurity. While this result 
seems counterintuitive, it may be understood as a result of greater political and economic freedom in 
democratic societies that allow their citizens to express economic concerns more actively.  
18 On one hand, the convenience of interviewing fully employed persons may lead to higher response 
rates. On the other hand, more secure employment conditions of fully employed workers may make 
them less interested in the job security question yielding lower response rates. 
DV: Perceived Job Insecurity OECD Non-OECD  
Specification Change Quinn Index & Labor Spending  Polity Score Regime Type 
Openness    
ln Trade  -.024(.075) .060(.021)*** .056(.020)*** 
ln Trade Growth -.065(.012)*** .009(.001)*** .011(.001)*** 
ln Private Capital Flows  -.007(.014) .025(.014)* 
ln Priv. Cap. Flow Growth  .00001(.0002) .00004(.0003) 
Quinn Index -.093(.024)***   
Aggregate Controls    
Output Volatility .014(.044) .004(.002) .005(.002)** 
ln Unemployment .455(.090)*** .069(.013)*** .067(.013)*** 
ln Social Spending (1990)  .042(.012)*** -.031(.012)** 
ln Labor Spending (1990) -.564(.105)***   
ln GDP per capita .682(.243)*** -.243(.020)*** -.254(.019)*** 
Polity Score  .009(.003)***  
Regime Type   -.185(.023)*** 




likely to answer the job security question are also likely to feel more insecure about their job 
tenure. 
 
Table 4. Checking the Sample Selection Problem 
 
Main Regression OECD Non-OECD 
Openness   
ln Trade  -4.890(.704)*** .052(.019)*** 
ln Trade Growth -.0284(.039)*** .009(.001)*** 
ln Private Capital Flows 3.999(.584)*** -.002(.012) 
ln Priv. Capital Flow Growth -.077(.012)*** .0004(.0003) 
Aggregate Controls   
Output Volatility -.707(.012)*** .009(.002)*** 
ln Unemployment 2.039(.305)*** .069(.012)*** 
ln Social Spending .180(.112) .053(.011)*** 
ln GDP per capita 3.559(.519)*** -.218(.017)*** 
Selection Model   
Fully Employed .234(.214) .006(.033) 
Age -.016(.007)** -.002(.001)** 
Sex -.197(.215) -.226(.034)*** 
Education -.025(.049) .182(.008)*** 
Class .042(.086) .226(.019)*** 
Ideology -.079(.052) .056(.007)*** 
Constant 4.084(.677)*** .130(.106) 
ρ -.989(4.900) .682(.070)*** 
Wald χ2 199.35*** 487.75*** 
N 6555 26100 
See the notes for Table 1. The dependent variable in the selection regression is a dummy variable 
representing missing responses. 
 
 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the relative effects of the aggregate variables for the two 
country samples. These graphs based on the regressions of Table 4 display the estimates for 
the marginal effects of the aggregate variables evaluated at their mean values and the 95% 
confidence intervals around those estimates.
19
 For the OECD countries, the level of trade 
shows the biggest impact on the probability to mention job security as important. Its 
marginal effect is to decrease the dependent probability by 1.79 (plus or minus 0.26). The 
second largest effect is of the level of private capital flows, whose marginal effect is to 
increase the dependent probability by 1.46 (plus or minus 0.21). For the non-OECD 
countries, the level of trade shows the second biggest effect closely following that of 
unemployment rates. The marginal effects of trade and its growth are to increase the 
dependent probability by 0.018 (plus or minus 0.007) and 0.003 (plus or minus 0.0004), 
respectively. 
                                                          
19  These estimates tell us how much change would result in the dependent probability from an 
incremental change in the independent variable, thus allowing a comparison of the relative size of the 
effects of the different macro-level variables. 
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Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Aggregate Variables on 




























































Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Aggregate Variables on 
































































































4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Globalization has brought the issue of economic insecurity to the fore in international 
political economy, as economic instability due to global integration becomes a major threat 
to maintaining the social fabric of market societies around the globe. Based on the idea of 
globalization-induced economic insecurity, scholars of international political economy have 
advanced a variant of the embedded liberalism thesis (Ruggie 1987) called the compensation 
Figure 1. Marginal Effects of Aggregate Variables on  
Perceived Job Insecurity [OECD] 
Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Aggregate Variables on  
Perceived Job Insecurity [Non-OECD] 




hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, welfare state is not only resilient to the pressures of 
global economic forces but also increasingly relevant to the globalizing world, as 
globalization creates more demand for state-provided social protection and insurance against 
economic insecurity generated by its processes.  
Despite the centrality of economic insecurity in the globalization studies and discourses, 
it has not received close scrutiny whether globalization indeed leads to greater economic 
volatility and insecurity as well as perceptions thereof. As expounded in this study, the 
impact of globalization on economic insecurity can take multiple routes. Globalization can 
raise macroeconomic volatility, though the empirical evidence is mixed. It may also 
influence people’s perceptions of insecurity directly, which possibly explains why a majority 
of citizens in recent polls turn out to associate globalization to various economic problems 
even when their economies do not suffer major setbacks.  
This study examines the effect of openness on economic insecurity by relating the 
perception of job insecurity to various measures of economic openness. The probit analysis 
of the survey responses of the citizens of forty-three countries reveals a notable divergence in 
the effect of trade on the perceptions of job insecurity between developed and developing 
countries; trade openness is linked to greater perceived job insecurity in the non-OECD 
countries but to less perceived job insecurity in the OECD countries. 
This finding has an important implication for the studies of globalization. Contrary to the 
claim that increasing openness generates greater demand for social spending via increasing 
economic insecurity, the current finding reveals that the causal mechanism is much more 
complex than the claim suggests. The openness-insecurity link is absent in the developed 
region, while it is present in the developing region where paradoxically social welfare 
spending has generally declined with greater openness as shown in recent research (Kaufman 
& Segura_Ubiergo 2001; Rudra 2001).
20
  
Economic instability, whether manifested in the form of macroeconomic volatility or 
experienced as personal economic insecurity, takes a center stage in the research on 
globalization and domestic politics. A growing number of studies have explored the 
implications of increasing economic insecurity in a globalizing world for political and social 
instability, economic performance, and partisan politics (Kwon 2003; Moon & Yang 2002; 
Rodrik 1998b, 2000; Quinn & Woolley 2001). Understanding the complexity of the linkages 
between globalization and economic insecurity will thus be crucial for assessing the causal 
arguments of these studies as well as help to advance a better understanding of the problems 








                                                          
20 That is, the key assumption of the compensation logic, globalization-induced economic insecurity, 
holds in the developing world where the outcome  compensatory social spending  is not observed, 
whereas the openness-insecurity assumption is not met in the developed world where the outcome is 
most visible.  
 




Variables Definition and Source 
Perceived Job 
Insecurity 
Dichotomous variable with one (zero) if good job security is (not) 
mentioned for the survey question – “here are some more aspects of a job 
that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones 
you personally think are important in a job?” [V77 from WVS] 
Openness  
Trade Exports plus imports as % of GDP – averaged for 1990-94 [WDI] 
Private Capital Flows Private capital flows as % of GDP – averaged for 1990-94 [WDI] 
Quinn Index Capital market liberalization index, 0 = closed to 14 = most open capital 
market [Quinn & Inclan 1997] 
Aggregate Controls  
Output Volatility Standard deviation of the annual GDP growth rates (1990-94) [WDI] 
Unemployment Unemployment rates – averaged for 1990-94 [WDI] 
Social Spending Total government social spending as % of GDP, 1990 [WDI] 
GDP per capita GDP per capita, PPP – averaged for 1990-94 [WDI] 
Labor Spending Expenditures on unemployment compensation and active labor market 
programs as % of total social spending, 1990 [OECDSOC] 
Democracy Polity Score (-10 = autocracy to 10 = democracy) [Polity IV] 
Regime Type 0 = democracy, 1 = dictatorship [ACLP]  
Individual Controls All from [WVS] 
Education 1 = no formal education to 9 = university level education 
Age Age in years 
Class 1 = upper class to 5 = lower class 
Sex 0 = female, 1 = male 
Ideology 1 = left to 10 = right 
Fully Employed 1 if fully employed, 0 otherwise 
 
Data Sources 
ACLP: Democracy and Development Database, Przeworski et al. 2000. 
OECDSOC: OECD Social Expenditures [CD-ROM], OECD. 
Polity IV: Polity IV Dataset: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2003, 
Center for International Development and Conflict Management. 
WDI: World Development Indicators [CD-ROM], World Bank. 
WVS: World Values Surveys, Ronald Inglehart et al. 1999 [ICSPR Study #2790]. 
 
Sample of Countries 
OECD: Australia, Finland, Germany, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States. 
Non-OECD: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Georgia, 
India, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
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